Chapter 103. New Religions and the Party-State: Falun Gong, Soka Gakkai, Aum, Cao Dai and Keshe’s China

In the twentieth century revolutionary and nationalist states took up the old East Asian question of who decides orthodoxy. China’s Party encouraged, then crushed, a qigong revival. Japan’s postwar freedom produced hundreds of new religions, one armed with nerve gas. Vietnamese sects raised armies. This chapter reports these cases as the library’s sources present them, gives both sides of the contested ones, and sets out Mehran Keshe’s account of China as his Foundation’s partner.

From the Cultural Revolution to the Qigong Boom

James MacRitchie writes: “Following the disaster of The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the passing of Mao in ’76… Deng Xiaoping assumed absolute power, and the hallmark of his rule was ‘modernization’.” He adds that, “According to Palmer, thousands of Qigong ‘Masters’ suddenly emerged – many of them self-app[ointed]” [MacRitchie, The Eight Extraordinary Meridians Qigong, #51432, Part II (part 53)]. His political judgement is blunt: “the Chinese authorities just don’t ‘get’ Democracy… for them the leaders lead, and the people do what they are told” [MacRitchie, #51432, Part II (part 3)].

Kevin Williamson says the Party promoted qigong in the 1980s as Chinese essence and national pride. “But in the 1990s, when some qigong masters (Li Hongzhi of Falun Gong was not the first) decided to build their own organizations outside Party control,” the exercises became an “evil cult” and a target of repression. His note 18 quotes a passage holding that the Party leadership’s highest priority is “not economic development, or a just society… but its own grip on power” [Williamson, The Smallest Minority, #87845, note 18]. According to the reference shelf, the authorities ordered all qigong groups to set up Party branches in 1995. Falun Gong refused, its books were banned in July 1996, and the official press called it “feudal superstition” [Wikipedia: Persecution of Falun Gong].

Falun Gong: Founding, Confrontation and Ban

Daniel Lacoste’s Romanian thriller Secta diabolică is fiction, and it carries the pro-Falun Gong narrative. It describes “a qigong school with four sets of standing exercises and one of meditation,” founded by Li Hongzhi, “who first spoke publicly of this movement in 1992.” It dates the persecution from “23 April 1999, following a very slanderous press article in a newspaper in the city of Tianjin,” after which “about ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners” gathered in Beijing two days later [Lacoste, Secta diabolică, #16758, parts 11, 19; translated]. The reference account dates the Tianjin arrests to 22 April and puts “upwards of 10,000” practitioners at Zhongnanhai on 25 April. Jiang Zemin called the gathering “the most serious political incident since the ‘4 June’ political disturbance in 1989,” and the eradication campaign began on 20 July 1999 [Wikipedia: Persecution of Falun Gong]. MacRitchie gives the underlying reason: “Falungong grew to the point were it rivaled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in numbers of members.” He notes drily that Li sought no financial rewards for anyone “(except, not surprisingly, himself)” [MacRitchie, #51432, Part II (part 54)].

The Contested Case: Persecuted Faith or “Evil Cult”

The persecution account. The reference article describes the extra-constitutional “6-10 Office” and reports of torture and forced labour. By 2009 at least 2,000 practitioners had reportedly died in custody, and courts in Spain and Argentina had indicted senior officials. Allegations of organ harvesting followed from 2006, with one estimate of 65,000 practitioners killed between 2000 and 2008 [Wikipedia: Persecution of Falun Gong]. David Rothkopf describes the movement’s response abroad: “At government buildings in Beijing and Chinese consulates around the world, Falon Gong members hold regular gatherings, usually silent demonstrations or vigils… armed with props such as graphic posters, fake blood, and cages” [Rothkopf, Superclass, #79621, ch. 9 (part 269)]. The Tofflers’ notes cite reports headlined “For Beijing, Fear Grows as Spirituality Blossoms” and “China Opens Door to Christianity – Of a Patriotic Sort” [Toffler, Avuţia în mişcare, #9847, notes 47-48].

The cult account. Rick Alan Ross writes that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published his 2009 paper “Is Falun Gong a Cult?” He describes meeting “self-immolation survivors and former Falun Gong practitioners Hao Huijun and her daughter, Chen Guo,” who “participated in a staged protest at Tiananmen Square on the Chinese New Year’s Eve on January 23, 2001.” He calls it “the most poignant and heartbreaking meeting I have ever attended” and dedicates his book to them [Ross, Cults Inside Out, #62875, ch. 23 “Moving On”]. The reference shelf records that the event is disputed. Falun Gong says its teachings forbid suicide. The Washington Post found that “no one ever saw [the two dead] practice Falun Gong,” and some journalists argued the immolations were staged by the state [Wikipedia: 2001 Tiananmen Square self-immolation incident].

Japan’s “Rush Hour of the Gods”

Carmen Blacker finds a shamanic pattern behind Japan’s new religions: “A series of almost unendurable sufferings culminates in a terrific experience of divine possession.” Nakayama Miki, “the Foundress of Tenrikyō, now the largest and richest of the ‘new’ cults,” gave away the family property under divine command. In January 1892 Deguchi Nao went into a violent trance, and her god “announced its name to be Ushitora-no-Konjin… in order that the present hideous state of the world should be transformed into a paradise.” Organisers made these founders’ powers spread: “Had not Nakayama Miki been joined by Izō Iburi, Deguchi Nao by Ueda Kisaburō, or Kitamura Sayo by Nakamura Kimitake,” they might never have reached beyond a local circle [Blacker, The Catalpa Bow, #50912, parts 99-105]. Jeremy Roberts says such sects “used old Shinto methods for healing” [Roberts, Japanese Mythology A to Z, #78726]. Archer counted “over six hundred” new religions since 1945, “syntheses of Buddhism, Shinto, and Christianity” [Archer, Faiths Men Live By, #55131, ch. 7].

Soka Gakkai. Taro Gold, an insider, writes that Makiguchi founded the movement in 1930 and “staunchly opposed Japan’s military government.” After the war “Toda and his successor, Daisaku Ikeda, rebuilt the Soka Gakkai, which now has twelve million members in 180 nations” [Gold, Open Your Mind, Open Your Life, #47096]. Howell Woltz, a conspiracy author, lists “Daisaku Ikeda – founder of the Soka Gakkai cult” among Club of Rome figures [Woltz, The Carbon Hoax, #72306].

Aum Shinrikyo: Apocalypse as Politics

Arthur Goldwag describes Aum as mixing “Buddhism, Hinduism, and apocalyptic Christianity.” It was “founded in Tokyo in 1987” by a blind acupuncturist “who called himself Shoko Asahara and claimed to be the reincarnation of the god Shiva (his parents had named him Chizuo Matsumoto).” Twelve members were sentenced to death, and the group survives “in a much smaller form as Aleph” [Goldwag, Cults, Conspiracies, and Secret Societies, #73961]. Budowle’s forensic volume draws out the political ambition. Matsumoto once hoped to be “Prime Minister of Japan,” and the sect built “22 ministries,” assuming “the form of a shadow government.” Police were slow to act partly because Aum “was but one of more than 180,000 minor religions active in Japan” [Budowle, Microbial Forensics, #29475, “The Kameido Anthrax Incident”]. The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Cults says Asahara labelled the United States “the beast in the book of Revelation” and “regarded SOKA-GAKKAI as his chief religious/political rival.” It dates the attack to 25 March 1995 [Mather, Nichols & Schmidt, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Cults, #65667, “Aum Shinrikyo; Aleph”]. The reference shelf gives 20 March 1995: fourteen dead, more than 200 arrests, and thirteen leaders executed [Wikipedia: Tokyo subway sarin attack]. Ross says Asahara saw plots by “Jews, Freemasons, and rival Japanese religions.” He adds that “the Dalai Lama… also lent credibility to Asahara,” who had donated about $1.2 million, and that after the attack the Dalai Lama still called him a “friend, although not necessarily a perfect one” [Ross, #62875, ch. 1].

Vietnam: Sects with Armies

Edward Luttwak lists the South Vietnamese power blocs of 1968. “Hoa Hao: A reformed Buddhist sect with a large following in the southern (Delta) part.” “Cao Dai: An important Buddhist sect with a history of political participation.” “Binh Xuyen: A small but very active part-sect and part-secret society,” said to “own” Saigon’s police and underworld [Luttwak, Coup d’État, #66112, ch. 2]. Robert Asprey treats “The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao” as a stage in the anti-French struggle [Asprey, War in the Shadows, #70898, contents]. The Hòa Hảo, founded in 1939, “rapidly developed into a private army,” fought the Việt Minh, who killed its founder, and later opposed Diệm [Wikipedia: Hòa Hảo]. Caodaism was founded at Tây Ninh in 1926 out of a spiritist circle that read Kardec and Hugo [Wikipedia: Caodaism]. Martin Ebon’s introduction to Chambers’s book reports that adherents date the first encounter with Victor Hugo’s spirit to “April 20, 1930, at 1:00 a.m., the earthly interviewer being one Hô-Pháp” [Chambers, Victor Hugo’s Conversations with the Spirit World, #64805, introduction].

Keshe’s China

A Brazilian Knowledge Seeker’s introduction to KSW 495 is marked “Not checked by KF.” It says the West tried “to silence” Keshe’s technology, while “through the wisdom of President Xi” China chose “the path of peace.” China is the right partner because “they don’t have the religious dogmas and fanaticism we see in other countries. Their upbringing is in Taoism, which like the Plasma, seeks to accommodate.” The author adds that “the Chinese will handle commercialization of products” [Keshe, China will lead us to Peace, #378541]. In the transcript Keshe says: “I trusted the Chinese leadership.” He says the Silk Road policy would become a peace policy [Keshe, KSW 495, #378207]. In KSW 496 he announces that “Keshe Foundation will become China Keshe Organization Corporation.” He says his technology “has written into the 14th and the 15th program of the Chinese nation,” and describes a “Space Defense System” to be delivered to “Chinese highest rank military officers” [Keshe, KSW 496, #378208]. KSW 644 reports agricultural work with “Support of locals and CPC – part of 5 year Program – bring 30 million farmers out poverty,” alongside teaching on the “Ethos of Mitra” [Keshe, KSW 644, #378356].

On Chinese culture he says of their fear: “They can’t live without it, they’ve been ingrained into it… you cannot take this out of the blood of Chinese” [Keshe, KSW 656, #378368]. In KSW 659 he describes an assassination attempt at a Beijing safe house in which, he says, two young officers were killed. He attributes it to “the Belgians.” He also describes ten days of interrogation and a death threat from Canadian officials at Toronto airport [Keshe, KSW 659, #378371].

Comparative Close for Part 10

Mitchell Heisman writes that “Confucianism might be the closest analog to early Judaism,” since both “emphasize ancestral wisdom as a guide for living in this world” and “behavior more than belief” [Heisman, Suicide Note, #38252, Part II]. In the 1950s Archer asked, “Will Marxism be offered the Chinese as a new state religion?… a study of Chinese history throws doubt upon its success” [Archer, #55131, ch. 3]. Harari, writing decades later, states that North Korea “indoctrinates its subjects with a fanatical state religion called Juche” [Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, #65632]. One pattern runs through these sources: the East Asian state acts as judge of orthodoxy, and movements that organise outside its control meet co-optation or suppression.

Key points

• MacRitchie (citing Palmer) and Williamson describe a qigong boom after 1976 that the Party first promoted, then repressed.
• MacRitchie says Falun Gong rivalled the CCP in numbers. The April 1999 Zhongnanhai gathering came before the July 1999 ban.
• The reference shelf reports the persecution, Rothkopf describes the movement’s protests abroad, and Lacoste’s novel tells the movement’s side. Ross presents Falun Gong as a cult. The 2001 immolation remains disputed.
• Blacker traces Tenrikyo and Omoto to shamanic possession. Archer counts more than 600 new religions in postwar Japan.
• Aum built a shadow government, named Soka Gakkai its rival, and released sarin in 1995. Mather and Wikipedia differ on the date.
• Hoa Hao and Cao Dai acted as armed political blocs. Cao Dai venerated Victor Hugo’s spirit through séances.
• Keshe presents Taoist China under Xi as his partner. He claims a place in its five-year plans and recounts assassination attempts.